

Gendered Politics and Conflict Resolution:

Women's Impact on Conflict Management Solutions in Civil Conflict

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Abstract

This article analyzes the decision-making process of a state utilizing mediation as a conflict management solution. Mediation is the use of a third party actor during the negotiation process to achieve an outcome that will lead to peace. This article theorizes that states that have higher female participation in politics leads to states being more active members in international organizations which will lead states be more likely to use mediation as a form of conflict management solution than going about the peace process without an outside mediator. This process is because the author theorizes that states that have higher female participation will be perceived as being weaker by rivals within a state, and states will reach out to the international community as a protector from conflict. Prior to looking at this relationship, this paper looks at the impact of female participation on the longevity of peace and state's membership in international organizations. These relationships are observed by using data on women in parliament from the Inter-Parliamentary Union and looking at a variety of different measures for conflict management solutions. My expectations are supported by the results, showing that there is a positive impact of female political participation on peace longevity, international organization membership, and on the mediation decision-process.

I. INTRODUCTION

Historically, women have been placed outside the bounds of politics in most societies in the world. This has led to the political realm to be treated as strictly a male sphere and intense vitriol toward women who desire to be included in this male dominated society. While women have been excluded from being involved in politics, the male controlled field had expanded its masculinity of conflict by continuing the practice of intense violence to determine the victors over a disputed area of politics. Over the past century, individuals have been campaigning for the inclusion of women in politics in order to give a gentler overtone to politics and the management of conflict. This effort has led to the discovery that the inclusion of women in politics has made an impact on

the likelihood and outcome of peace (Caprioli, 2000, 2003, 2005; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Gizelis, 2009; Melander, 2005; Regan and Paskeviciute, 2003; Tickner, 2001; Robison, 2010). Women have been successfully making gains within political representation over the past few decades, with women holding 22.6 percent of seats within parliaments in the world in 2016 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2016). Alongside growth in the legislatures, women have increasingly been gaining power in the forms of the executive and seats on high courts (Jalalzai, 2008; Williams and Thames, 2008). Along the growth of women in politics, states have started creating gender quotas, which have led to more participation by women than ever before (Caul, 1999, 2001; Hughes, Krook, and Paxton, 2015; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Thames and Williams, 2010; Yoon, 2004). With these global increases in female involvement in global politics, we

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would expect using Thames and Williams (2014) theory of contagious representation, that as women gain access to political offices, this will make it easier for more women to also be raised up into similar positions. With this contagious representation effect, we would expect that conflict would be on the decline since according to the gender literature, women are predisposed to avoid violence, and according to the conflict literature there is currently a decline in war (Gat, 2012; Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla, 2000; Newman, 2009; Pinker, Thayer, Levy, and Thompson, 2013). This has also lead to backlash by those more conservative sections of society that still deem women to be unfit for the political realm and that the inclusion of women in politics is a sign of weakness because of their lessened desire for conflict, compared to men. I establish this paper on this theory that the involvement in women in politics will decrease the likelihood of conflict and lead states with higher female participation to request assistance from the international community in ending conflict. Much of the literature surrounding civil conflict has looked at why states that reach peace renege on these peace accords.

"Why does civil conflict lead to more civil conflict?" This question has been asked within the literature of international relations over countless times, many variables have been identified in the literature that effect renegeing on peace accords, completed outcome of the conflict, by the means of destructiveness, loss of will to continue fighting, or international peacekeepers (Doyle and Sambanis, 2005; Fortna, 2003, 2004; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, 2001; Mason, Gurses, Brandt, and Quinn, 2011; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007; Werner, 1999; Werner and Yuen, 2005). Another major focus in renegeing on peace accords comes from domestic politics and characteristics, such as, political, economic, and social (Collier, 2003; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Mason, Gurses, Brandt, and Quinn, 2011; Walter, 2004). Demeritt, Nicholas, and Kelly (2014) was able to look at the impact of women joining the economic, social, and

political discussion after a civil conflict also helps alleviate the reoccurrence of civil conflict within a state. This allows for women to move from the "margins of society" and have a positive impact on society (Beckwith, 2000; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Hughes and Tripp, 2005; Matland, 2003; Weldon, 2002). However, Thames and Williams (2013) show that once women gain access to political power, it spreads throughout the state. This "contagious representation" helps alleviate and transform the status quo towards a more gender positive society. This is a complete restructure of the socially constructed gender roles.

Two main theoretical arguments for this relationship are the essentialist argument and the constructivist argument. The essential argument theorizes that humans are predisposed to inherent biological qualities that are underlying in all individuals decision-making process (Grosz, 1995). Thence, all women should have an innate desire to give life and not to take because of their motherly instinct, which are deeply embedded on them at birth. This ingrained response should instinctively drive all women, without any context of cultural heritage, to desire to deescalate conflict and promote peace. The second theoretical argument, constructivism, propounds that females shun away from violence because of socially constructed gender roles, that of which boys are raised playing violent games based on conflict, while a girl is taught to play with *Barbie* dolls and be more sophisticated inclinations (Enloe, 2014). The integration of women in to the political culture would then imply a reordering of the gender roles that have been existing prior to the assimilation. This would show that societies that promoted female political or social participation are more likely to also adopt peaceful goals. Therefore, it should be expected that as women within states with past civil conflicts gain more clout and influence within the social, economic, and political spheres of society, the probability of conflict within these states would decrease. For the purpose of this paper, the author will take the

side of the socially constructed gender roles, as essentialist gender theory does not allow for a spectrum of gender roles across societies, nor for women to gain a propensity for violence, nor for men to have an appetite for peace. On average post-conflict societies can maintain pre-conflict marginalization of women, but this is not always the norm (Demeritt et al, 2015). In some cases, civil conflict can cause the destruction of status quo positions within the state and allow for a drastic transformation to occur. When this opportunity materializes, the movement of women into the greater communion of economic, social, and political interaction can cause greater female autonomy, responsibility, and individual value (Turshen, 1998; Hughes, 2009). As well as, states that do experience conflict again, but have moved women away from the periphery of society towards the center, will be more likely to desire a quick, concise conclusion to the dispute, and request a third party intervention to take place, as this paper theorizes.

The purpose of this paper is to look at two questions within in the conflict literature and the gender literature. First, does female participation in politics prevent the reoccurrence of conflict? Secondly, if conflict reoccurs, what paths to peace will gender diverse states decide to take? Previous literature has been fairly lacking in these areas. While Demeritt et al (2015) did examine this first issue, finding that politically active women reduce the likelihood of resurgence of conflict, they do not continue the story through the peace process. Specifically, what happens to the peace process when women are have political power? I build off the work that Demeritt et al (2015) did, theoretically, but I examine, empirically, if the involvement of women in the political process will have a significant impact on the conflict management decision-making process and change the manner in which the state goes about deciding the form of conflict management to take. I theorize that states with a higher proportion of women in legislature, which is used as a proxy for female political participation, will desire to use external re-

sources, such as international organizations, courts, or third party mediators, than striving for all out victory individual state on state negotiation. Gender theories suggest that women have little desire for conflict and would want for an external force to come and mediate in the situation, instead of continuing conflict. Since women are viewed as weaker leaders in times of conflict, (Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister, 2011), the inclusion of more female leadership and participation will lead to more conservative factions of society to see an opportunity to take advantage of this state. In order for states to prevent the return to conflict, states with larger female participation join international organizations. These international organizations help alleviate the threat of internal violence because of a state's ability to rely on aid from its allies in times of need.

Model:

Conflict Ends → ↑ *Female Participation* → ↓
Conflict, ↑ *Participation in International Organizations*
 → ↑ *Mediation*

The model above shows the hypothesized relationships. The first relationship is understood by the literature that with the end of conflict in some states, women are allowed into the center of society, from the fringes (Beckwith, 2000; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Hughes and Tripp, 2005; Matland, 2003; Weldon, 2002). Even though the literature does not go into detail of what are the true causal mechanisms for some states being able to bring women from the "margins" to the center. The second relationship is between female participation, conflict, and international organizations. As female participation increases, the likelihood of conflict decreases, as well as, the likelihood of joining and participating in international organizations increases. The third and final relationship is that states with higher female participation will use their connections within the international community in order to have a mediator for conflict resolution negotiations.

Hypothesis 1:

States that have a higher level of female political participation will be less likely to reenter civil conflict

Hypothesis one is built upon the gender literature that says that when women gain access to political power, they will be less willing to reenter conflict and will desire to maintain peace, this should be shown in an overall increase in peace duration or the complete elimination of conflict all together. The return of men from conflict could possibly lead to a desire to repress the newly more politically powerful women who have had to step in while the men were away at war, so women and other vulnerable sects of society should see the formation of specific activist groups for those repressible sects of society. If repression does not occur, then Thames and Williams's (2014) theory of contagious representation should continue to occur and women should continue to gain access to more seats and political influence.

Hypothesis 2:

States that have a higher level of female political participation will be more active within international organizations

Hypothesis two continues to build upon the gender literature that states that women will have little desire for conflict and will be ill equipped to deal with conflict when it does occur, so they will require the aid of outsiders in order to achieve an effective end goal, because the opposing forces will be aware of the weakness within the state with strong female participation and have a stronger desire to gain more from an end game. Therefore, states with high female participation will join and be active within several international organizations in order to have some protection from threats of force because of their perceived weakness.

Hypothesis 3:

Because states with high level of female political participation are more active within international organizations, they will be more likely to use mediation as a means to end conflict

Hypothesis three builds off of the past two hypotheses by showing that when states do experience conflict, they use the connections that they have made within international organizations to help mediate the problem as attempt to avoid violence. So this article would expect that this path to peace will be the probable path to peace if the first two hypotheses hold true, compared to the other options that the states can take. This is because states that have higher female participation should have less military spending and preparedness for conflict would be meager compared to rival states. This would also assume that states with high female participation should ordinarily be the threatened state and not the perpetrator of the violence. This should also hold with civil conflict as female participation increases other disenfranchised members of the state that were rebelling against the influence of that state should be also gaining access to state reducing the future likelihood for emerging conflict.

II. METHODS

Unit of Analysis: The unit of analysis for all three groups of models are separate, as the first group looks at the likelihood of renegeing on peace accords and returning to conflict. The unit of analysis here are civil conflicts within the Sambanis (2004) dataset that have had a civil war between 1980-2003. The unit of analysis in the second group of models is looking at all states in country-years and the number of international organizations each is in in that certain year. This allows for the most broad understanding of the relationship between female political participation and states' participation in the international community. The final group of models the unit of analysis is individual mediation events. These mediation events are clustered around states so that they have some relationship with repeat mediation in an individual state.

Dependent Variables: For the first hypothesis, I uses peace duration (the lack of conflict re-occurring) measured in years from 1980-2003, with some gaps in the beginning time periods.

The dataset that I used to gather my conflict data, determines peace only when all civil wars in the state have ended. The measurements to see what times conflict in these states begins and ends, and in what forms, this article uses civil war data from Sambanis's dataset. Sambanis defines civil war as an organized armed conflict taking place within the controlled territory of a recognized state with a population of at least half a million and involving the government of the state in which controls the territory and a resistance movement with political and militarized organization (Sambanis, 2004). This dataset was found more useful than other datasets because it defines war as starting when the first year of 500-1,000 battle deaths occur, and peace when either battle deaths go below 500 battle-deaths for three consecutive years, a signed peace deal is in place with 6 months of consecutive peace, or when the resistance movement has an absolute victory which leads to the formation of a new government within the territory, which is recognized globally. These lower levels of death tolls allows for more conflict to be included in the dataset, and decrease the likelihood of conflict dying off slowly. For the second hypothesis, this article uses political inclusion of women by looking at the percentage of parliamentary seats held by women in each given year. This data is a combination of data from Paxton, Green, and Hughes (Paxton, Green, and Hughes, 2006), the World Bank's World Development Indicators, and data from the Inter-parliamentary Union. Percentage of women in parliament is also used as a key independent measurement for female participation in testing for hypothesis one, but is strictly from Paxton, Green, and Hughes, 2006. For the final hypothesis, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable on the conflict management decision that states in civil conflicts make, whether or not they will use a mediator for the peace accords. This data was coded by the author using UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset from Uppsala Universitet. This was coded by the author when any peace accord that had an international mediator signature on it as a one and those without media-

tors a zero.

Independent Variables: The first key aspect is measuring female participation in society, and much of the literature desires to show female participation as a spectrum of social, political, and economic variables in order to show their impact on the reoccurrence of civil conflict. These variables are also by definition inter-related and reinforcing, but as Caprioli states, "In theory, each measure of gender equality captures a different aspect of equality - social, political, or economic. In practice, however, the three measures are highly correlated, for social, political, and economic access are inter-dependent... As a result, each gender equality variable does not represent a discrete measure of social, political, or economic equality, but represents a combination of all three, with each measure having a different emphasis" (Caprioli, 2000, p. 56). First, we define our variable for political participation, which is also the dependent variable for hypothesis two, women in the parliament from a combination of Paxton, Green, and Hughes, 2006, World Bank's World Development Indicators, and the data from Inter-parliamentary Union. The economic measure for female participation is the percentage of the adult labor force that is made up of female individuals. This data is taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. And finally, this article's measurement for social participation in hypothesis one is a ratio of female-to-male literacy rates. This data is taken from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which defines literacy as the ability to read, write, and understand information that is obtained throughout a daily life of the individual. Demeritt et al (2015) creates this variable by dividing the female literacy rate of state, by the male literacy rate of the state. Caprioli uses fertility rates as her measurement of social participation and equality (Caprioli, 2000, 2005), and this is used as a control for other forms of female participation in the second model. Another key independent variable in this data is the number of international organizations a states is a member of in each

given year. This variable was calculated by the author by using the Correlates of War (CoW) dataset of international organizations. I also created summaries of the number of international organizations that each state was a part of each year from this dataset, and then taken the natural log of, in order to balance out the large outliers. In the final group of models, the key independent variable is an interaction of percentage of women in parliament and a logged number of international organization a state is a member of at the time of mediation.

Control Variables: For these models, several controls were included in the models in order to help alleviate some concerns theoretically as well as appease the literature in their respective fields. The first control is the inclusion of the natural log of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, this data is taken from the World Development Indicators. In the third model, wealth is measured by using Gleditsch's (2002) dataset of Gross Domestic Product. This is used because a lack of overlap with some of the cases and the data provided by the World Development Indicators. This variable is used to control for the national attribute of development and personal wealth. The next group of controls are used to measure regime type, Unified Democracy Scores, which uses a Bayesian latent variable approach in order measure democratization from ten already established models (Pernstein, Meserve, and Melton, 2010). "Using a democracy scale in one's research will no longer force scholars to make an arbitrary choice and casually cast aside the vast majority of the information available on the topic. This is especially important in situations where extant scales provide divergent estimates of democracy level..." (Pernstein, Meserve, and Melton, 2010, p. 427). In the first model, Polity II was used instead of Unified Democracy Scores. This was because with the inclusion of Unified Democracy Scores, the model would break the proportional hazards assumption, but with the use of Polity II, this was not the case. The substantive results are not drastically changed between models. This is a 21 point scale ranging from -10 to +10,

where higher values relate to higher levels of democratic institutions within the states. To account for the possibility that democratic institutions have a nonlinear relationship with conflict and conflict reoccurrence, this article uses a squared democracy score variable alongside the original to account for this theoretical concern (Mason, Gurses, Brandt, and Quinn, 2011). War Duration from Sambanis's (2004) dataset is also used to control for the hazard of returning to conflict in the first model. Infant mortality rates are also included in the first model, in order to control for poverty, and for a look at the pressure on mothers in the home with survival of the child.

In the second group of models, fertility rates, as stated before, was used as a moderator for economic activity of women. Along side fertility rates, GDP per capita and democracy scores continue as controls into this grouping of models. A dichotomous measurement of gender quotas within the legislature was also included in the second model to control for international pressures on the legislatures prior to the inclusion in international organizations. This variable is taken from Thames and Williams (2013) and is strictly a measure of national laws with the requirement of a gender quota in the legislature and not including states that have individual parties with gender quotas. Male unemployment rates is also used as a control within the second group of models, as the inclusion of women in the economy theoretically leads to a decrease in the available jobs for men, as well as, male unemployment can lead to a return to conflict. The final control variable in the second group of models is military expenditure as a percentage of state gross domestic product. Both measurements of male unemployment and military expenditure are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.

In the third and final group of models, a naturally logged form of Gleditsch's (2002) measurement for gross domestic product is included as a measurement of wealth within each state for that year. Measurements for regime type, in Unified Democracy Scores is

also used within these models. Male unemployment rates are also used as a control for female economic participation and a measurement for the likelihood of continued conflict after mediation takes place.

Models Specification: For the first group of models, this article uses a stratified Cox proportional hazards estimator. This looks at the hazard of a reemergence of conflict in a year, and also taking into account the duration of peace. The hazard rate for each unit i is:

$$h(t|x_i) = h_0(t)exp(x_i\beta)$$

In this equation, h_0t is the baseline hazard function, when x_i is equal to zero. The hazard ratio function:

$$= exp((x_{k'} - x_k)\hat{\beta})$$

The Cox proportional hazards model is interpreted by looking at unit changes in x_k , which one unit change in x_k is expected to change the hazard rate by $(exp(\beta_k - 1) * 100\%)$. A Cox proportional hazards model is preferred in this case because it does not require that risk be a specific function, and leaves duration outside the factoring of the model. Cox proportional hazards models also allows for the ability to better handle ties in the data. In order to estimate the variables of the model, the partial likelihood function needs to be estimated instead of calculated, I have decided to use the Efron method for ties over other methods. This is because Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) shows that the Breslow method causes severe bias when the number of ties is high, while the Efron method from Efron (1977) still performs well. However, if the number of ties is low or zero, both methods produce the same results. In the pretense of safety, I have determined to strictly use the Efron method in order to be less concerned with large number of ties.

For the second grouping of models, this article uses panel data, which allows for the author to better control for the impact of the data across time and space. For the first model

in this grouping, I simply used a fixed effects model. Fixed effect allow a constant measurement of the independent variables impact across all of the countries in the models. This is used when there is some unmeasured components of the panels that make each panel special from any other panel. Fixed effects allows for this to be controlled away, but it also could affect the overall results of the model by drastically reducing the degrees of freedom. This removal of information from the model can harm the overall results of the model, by reducing the movement in the model by taking what makes the individual panel different and parcels them into a dummy variable to strictly identify the panel compared to the other panels. The next model used was a mixed or hierarchical model for working with panel data. This way allows for the use of set variables to be used as the fixed effects measures, while allows the other variables to have more influence over the models results. The final model in this grouping uses Driscoll Kraay (1998) standard errors within the fixed effects regression. This allows the model to assume heteroskedastic, serial correlated, and perhaps correlation across panels, which is helpful for the data provide as because of the porousness of the panels, tests for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, as well as, cross panel dependency would not run. By using this model, the results can be treated as if these processes do exist in the data, since this is likely.

For the final group of models, I used clustered probit regressions. This is because several states had multiple mediation events occurring in the same year, which would break the assumptions of a time-series cross-sectional regression. The models in this group are divided by the variables involved. The first model just includes the base independent variables, without the inclusion of the interaction. The second model as all of the control variables, but still excludes the interaction. The final model includes all of the controls as well as the interaction between the two key independent variables.

III. RESULTS

As table one shows below, the hypothesis that as female political participation increases the likelihood of renegeing on peace accords and returning to conflict decreases. While female political participation decreases likelihood of reentering conflict, female economic participation actually increases the likelihood of

returning to conflict. In the full model female social participation is insignificant, but in the restricted model it has significance and also aids in reducing the likelihood of reentering conflict. All of the controls are directionally pointing in the theoretical relationship that is expected, but are insignificant.

Table 1 - Cox Models

	Baseline b/se	Restricted b/se	Full b/se
Women in Parliament		-0.077** (0.03)	-0.093** (0.04)
Women in the Labor Force		0.067*** (0.02)	0.063** (0.02)
Literacy Ratio		-2.349** (1.11)	-0.904 (1.43)
GDP per Capita (log)	-0.237 (0.27)		-0.257 (0.48)
Democracy	0.017 (0.03)		-0.017 (0.04)
Democracy-squared	-0.020*** (0.01)		0.014 (0.01)
War duration	-0.011 (0.03)		-0.032 (0.05)
Infant Mortality Rate	0.004 (0.01)		0.008 (0.01)
AIC	239	99	104
BIC	263.1	112.4	139.3

Significant Level: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01"




Figure 1

As figure 1 above shows, when the percent-

age of women in parliament is at its minimum of zero percent, then the cumulative hazard of reentering civil conflict increases at a higher rate than that of the baseline hazard. Yet, when women in parliament is at its maximum of 48.8 percent of parliament, then the cumulative hazard of civil conflict reemerging in this state is fairly constant at zero across the time of the model.

Table two on the following page shows that across all three models states with higher levels of female participation in politics leads to states being members of more international

organizations, as shown in Figure 2. Male unemployment is also a strong, positive predictor of international organization membership. Military expenditure seems to have a negligible and insignificant impact on international organization membership. While, wealth as measured by GDP per capita has a negative impact on international organization membership. Regime type has a positive, but insignificant impact on international organization membership. Fertility rates has the most theoretically surprising results as it is positive and highly significant in the membership of international organization count of states. And finally, gender quotas has an negligible and insignificant impact on activeness in the international community.




Figure 2

Table 3 shows the results of the final group of models, these show that the interaction of women in parliament and membership in international organizations has a positive and significant effect on the mediation decision-making process for a majority of cases. As Figure 3 shows, around the mean percentage of women in parliament, the interaction between women in parliament and international organizations is statistically different from zero and significant in comparison to the minimum value of percentage of women in parliament, 0. This region that statistically different than zero is where the majority of the data in the model is at, as well. As theoretically expected, both wealth and male unemployment are negatively related and significant in the likelihood of these states using mediation as a conflict

management solution. Democracy squared is also positive and highly significant, showing that there is actually a U shaped relationship to mediation instead of a inverse U shape that would have been expected. This shows that mediation is more likely for states as they become more democratic as well as more authoritarian.




Figure 3

IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

As the results above show, female political participation has a strong positive effect on the longevity of peace, however, economically active women actually increases the likelihood of renegeing on peace accords and reentering conflict. This relationship could possibly be explained by the higher number of male unemployment in states with higher levels of female economic participation. This higher level of male unemployment will have a strong influence on states returning to civil conflict, with more disenfranchised men who are unable to obtain employment will be more likely to side with those opposition forces to the regime. But the inclusion of higher levels women in parliament, as a proxy for overall female political participation show that when women are moved from the "margins of society" they have a positive impact on maintaining peace.

For the second group of models, it shows that female participation has a positive and significant impact on international organization membership. This gives credence to my theory of states desiring to join the international community as protection from civil conflict arising,

which is the explanation as to why states with higher levels of female participation are less likely to return conflict. Not because of the larger number of female participation, but because of these states' desires to be involved in the international community. This relationship could bring about a major change in the overall understanding of female participation and conflict. Instead of these states having an impact from female participation this measurement of female participation could even be a proxy for simply liberalization of the overall society. The involvement of women in politics could be a symbol of the majority of the population being realigned under a new status quo, which these possible rebelling forces could be struggling against.

The final group of models continues to look at this idea of reworking of the status quo into a more liberal status quo that promotes peace over conflict and allows for women to have better access to the political sphere. These models show that international organization membership through the membership of women in parliament as a proxy for female participation has a positive impact on the decision-making process as the desire to use of a third-party mediator during the negotiation process. This relationship could be as theorized that female involvement in politics could lead states to desire to have an international mediator to be there in order to gain a more fair deal, as the opposing party within the state will believe they can push the "weaker" state towards a more favorable treaty toward them. With an international mediator in the negotiation process both parties will believe they are more likely to receive a fair deal. This relationship could also be this secondary theory of female political participation being just a proxy of states being aligned in a more liberal status quo.

This paper brings about support for my original theory that states with higher female participation will lead to states' desire to be involved in the international community as a defense against more conservative members of

society rebelling against the state, and if a rebellion does take place, these states will desire to have a mediator involved during the negotiations that lead to peace. This could also be a sign of a status quo liberalization, which could be a disapproval of the theorized relationship between gender and conflict. The future implications for this research could be major, such as looking at why some states can have a destruction of the status quo and realign into a more female friendly status quo. The literature has looked at this relationship but none have showed an actual causal mechanism as to why this transformation of the status quo takes place. Another future research interest in this field is the effect of female mediators on the negotiation process. The actual number of female mediators has been so minimal that there have been no actual real life data for this, however, Maoz (2009) performs an experiment to see the impact of female negotiators on the negotiation process. This experiment showed that women negotiators actually get a better deal as they are perceived to be kinder and gentler than the male negotiators. This paper looks at the impact of women involved in the political sphere of the state, but does not look at the impact of female involvement in the non-state actor who is rebelling against the state. Could the involvement of women within this nonstate actor allow for peace to occur earlier, with the assistance of an international mediator? The final key future research question is to continue to look at the transformation of the status quo towards a more liberal society which has an impact on conflict management decisions over the impact of female political participation. This participation could very well just be another side effect of this liberalization process that is going on, finding a solid measurement for liberalization and comparing its results to that of the female participation is key to understanding the actual impact of female political participation on conflict and the conflict management decision-making process.

Table 2 - International Organizations			
	Fixed	Mixed	Driscoll Kraay
	b/se	b/se	b/se
Women in Parliament	0.002*** (0.00)	0.001* (0.00)	0.002** (0.00)
Male Unemployment	0.005*** (0.00)	0.004** (0.00)	0.005* (0.00)
Military Expenditure	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.191*** (0.03)	0.011 (0.02)	-0.191* (0.10)
Democracy	0.007 (0.01)	0.044 (0.03)	0.007 (0.01)
Democracy ²	0.012 (0.01)	0.001 (0.02)	0.012 (0.01)
Fertility Rate	0.073*** (0.02)	0.035*** (0.01)	0.073*** (0.02)
Gender Quota	-0.007 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)
Time Trend	0.032*** (0.00)	0.025*** (0.00)	0.032*** (0.01)
Constant	3.746*** (0.24)	2.620*** (0.15)	3.746*** (0.47)
Random Effects Parameters			
GDP per capita (log)		-4.020*** (0.69)	
Democracy		-1.276*** (0.10)	
Democracy ²		-19.995*** (2.27)	
Constant		-1.300*** (0.17)	
Residual		-2.884*** (0.03)	
AIC	-2761.869	-1985.952	.
BIC	-2713	-1912	.

Significance Level: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 3 - Mediation

	1	2	3
	b/se	b/se	b/se
Women in Parliament	0.114** (0.05)	0.126** (0.05)	-2.219*** (0.80)
International Organizations	-1.65* (0.94)	-4.043** (1.55)	-11.108*** (3.36)
GDP (log)		-0.485** (0.19)	-0.575** (0.27)
Democracy		0.405 (0.43)	0.401 (0.47)
Democracy ²		0.998** (0.44)	0.961*** (0.36)
Male Unemployment		-0.180** (0.08)	-0.329*** (0.11)
WIP x IO			0.570*** (0.20)
Constant	6.580* (3.69)	22.069** (6.24)	52.830*** (15.00)
AIC	76.331	49.919	48.002
BIC	83	66	66

Significance Level: * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

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